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a fee simple in an executory estate in a 19o4 deed. This was the
common law rule as to grants, including grants of executory estates.
The rule has since been changed by G. C. 851o-I (1925) making
words of inheritance unnecessary in grants by deed. Inasmuch as
the deed in the principal case was made in 1849, the common law
rule would have been applicable as to executory estates; but the
principal case involved not an executory estate but a reversionary
interest. The common law never required words of inheritance in
the creation of reversionary interests 10 since reversions are not
granted but remain in the grantor.
The conclusion that a determinable fee was created finds addi-
tional support in this case in the doctrine that a trustee receives
only such title as is necessary for the purposes of his trust."
Although here the grant to the trustees was in terms an absolute fee,
it was in the form of a trust.'" In trusts the quantum of estate to
be taken by the beneficiary should be determined solely by the
grantor's expressed intention.'" Therefore the reverter clause in this
deed should have taken effect to limit the beneficiary's interest to a
determinable fee, and since the trustees would then need only a
determinable fee, a legal fee simple determinable should result.
H. S.M.
DOWER IN OHIO IN CASE OF FORCED SALE
A cotenant petitions for the partition of certain realty, claiming
an undivided one-half interest, and also for reasonable allowance
for permanent improvements made by the petitioner's assignor with
the other cotenant's consent. The latter's spouse claims right of
dower in his interest now held by a bankruptcy trustee and cross-
petitions for determination of the value of her estate therein and its
allowance to her out of the proceeds of the sale. Held: That the sale
be made, that the petitioner be allowed one-half of the value of the
improvements made, and that cross-petitioner's inchoate dower be
valued and paid out of the proceeds. Russell v. Russell, 137 Ohio
St. 153. In making the award of inchoate dower, the Court of
'- See footnote 3, .ropra.
" Young v. Bradley, 101 U. S. 782 (1879); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS, pp. 482-487.
U That this probably was a passive trust would not alter the result, since there is no
Statute of Uses in Ohio.
13 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS, pp. 664-665.
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Common Pleas of Paulding County based its finding on the Amer-
ican Experience Table of Mortality.
From the time Ohio was a part of the Northwest territory until
1932, dower existed as the method of giving the widow some means
of support in the property of her deceased husband. By the Ohio
statutes,1 she was given a one-third life interest in all the real prop-
erty of which her husband had been seized during coverture. Realiz-
ing the practical necessity, under such a statutory scheme, of dis-
posing immediately of inchoate dower despite its contingent char-
acter, courts worked out ready methods of calculating its present
value.2 Though explained in few cases, the method used generally
in Ohio was settled rather early. In Unger v. Leiter,' the Ohio
Supreme Court laid down the rule that the value of the wife's con-
tingent right of dower "may be ascertained by reference to the tables
of recognized authority on that subject, in connection with the state
of health and constitutional vigor of the wife and her husband." The
year before, in Black v. Kuhl;nan,4 the Bowditch Table had been
specifically approved for the calculation of inchoate dower., Hence
with the knowledge of the ages of the owner and his spouse and the
value of the property, the answer could be easily computed.6
I OHIo GEN. CoDE, Sec. 8606; Dunseth v. Bank of the United States, 6 Ohio 77 (1833).
2 Without such methods, the clumsiness of handling inchoate dower is illustrated by
the early English practice where specific performance was asked of a contract to convey
land with abatement of purchase price because the wife would not release dower. In
Wilson v. Williams, 3 J.r. (N.S.) 810 (1857), the court set aside one-third of the pur-
ehae money, giving the vendor the interest on it during the joint lives of himself and
his wife and the principal upon her death, should he survive her; otherwise the interest
was given to the wife after the vendor's death, and the principal given to the vendee at
her death. Inchoate dower was abolished in England by Act 3 and 4 William IV, c. 10S.
In Ohio, there was early legislative sanction of giving a present value to a wife's con.
tingent dower in the real estate of an insolvent debtor, where a statute directed the
probate court to ascertain such and that it be paid to her. 82 Ohio Laws 14.
3 32 Ohio St. 210 (1877).
430 Ohio St. 196 (1876).
r- As a result, that table is included in THRoCKMoRToN's OHIO CODE ANNOTATED, which
bears the seal of approval of Ohio's Secretary of State. In commenting on this and
other dower tables, it is pointed out that a court has authority, in determining the present
value of dower, to consider the state of health of the parties involved. Mandel v. Mc-
Clave, 46 Ohio St., 407, 22 N. E. 290, 15 Am. St. Rep. 627 (1889) is not merely a
mathematical calculation, and any reasonable manner of estimating the value of dower
is permissible in this state.
Als c there is a modern trend to base the calculation of all dower interests on the
American Experience Table of MNortality, which shows a slightly longer life expectancy
than the English Carlisle Table upon which the Bowditch Table is based.
Also see OHIo GE. CODE, See. 10512-1: "The American Experience Table of Mor-
tality shall be the legal basis of determining present value in probate matters."
6In 19 Corpus Juris, Dower, See. 107, is presented the method of ascertaining the
present value of inchoate dower that is used in many states: "Ascertain the present
value of an annuity for her life equal to the interest in the third of the proceeds of the
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In 1932, when other provision was made for the support of the
surviving spouse7  dower was abolished in all cases except those
where the decedent spouse had aliened or encumbered the property
during coverture.5 It was no longer to exist in those lands of which
he died seized. Where the transfer has been voluntarily made, there
is, then, no change from the situation as it existed prior to 1932;
unless the spouse executes a release of dower, she obtains a right
that becomes consummate if she survives her husbandY But where
the transfer is involuntary and made pursuant to a court order, there
is a strong argument that inchoate dower should be abolished. 10
There are cases in Ohio which hold it to be divested in a partition
proceeding, although a conflict exists on that point.1 ' It is quite well
established that inchoate dower cannot be set up against the state
when the land is being appropriated under the right of eminent do-
main.1 2  But, on the other band, it is nearly always allowed in bank-
ruptcy proceedings.' 8 Whether or not dower is to be recognized in
these involuntary proceedings depends upon the basic purpose of the
new statutory provision. Of the different likely reasons for the sav-
ing of dower in the case of property aliened or encumbered during
coverture, only one would justify allowance if the transfer is in effect
involuntary; this one being that the intention of the legislature was
estate to which her contingent right of dower attaches, and then to deduct from the
present value of the annuity for her life the value of a similar annuity depending on
the joint lives of herself and her husband, and the difference between those two sums
will be the present value of her contingent dower." This method was first used in Jack-
son v. Edwards, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 386 (aff. 22 Wend. 498) (1839); but it has been
cited with approval by many courts since then, among which are: Gordon v. Tweedy, 74
Ala. 232, 49 Am. Rep. 813 (1883); Brown v. Brown, 94 S. C. 492, 78 S. E. 447 (1913);
and Strayer v. Long, 86 Va. 557, 10 S. E. 574 (1890).
I By the statute of descent and distribution, Ohio Gen. Code § 10503-4, the surviving
spouse gets at least one-third of the estate in fee, and can get varying amounts up to
the entire estate depending on the number of children and surviving grandparents.
8 Ohio Gen. Code § 10502-1.
Hereafter this discussion will be written as if it were always the wife claiming
dower in her husband's property. Actually, by Ohio Gen. Code § 10502-1, the husband
may also claim dower in his wife's property to the same degree.
"0 Inchoate dower has been abolished entirely in England. Note 2, .upra.
"It has been held in the following cases that inchoate dower was divested by a
partition proceeding: Weaver v. Gregg, 6 Ohio St. 547, 67 Am. Dec. 355 (1856); Rich-
ards v. Richards, 13 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 153 (1912); and Kibler v. Hand, 88 Ohio St., 533,
106 N. E. 1064 (1913); see Long v. Long, 99 Ohio St. 330, 124 N. E. 161 (1919);
contra: Walker v. Hall, 15 Ohio St. 355 (1864); and Smith v. Rothschild, 4 Ohio C. C.
544, 2 Ohio C. D. 698 (1890). The right to inchoate dower was transmitted to the per-
sonalty in Gillett v. Miller, 12 Ohio C. C. 209, 5 Ohio C. D. 588 (1895).
"Canan v. Heffey, 27 Ohio App. 430 (1927). This qualifies Long v. Long, supra
note 11, by saying that the court there meant to divest inchoate dower in appropriation
proceedings only, and not in a partition proceeding.
"This has even been given legislative sanction, supra note 2.
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to give some support to the surviving spouse even if the deceased lost
the property unwillingly. But the statute has no relevancy to invol-
untarily transferred property if the legislative purpose was to give
to the wife an element of control over the husband's property, or,
more important, if it was to prevent the husband from deliberately
depriving his wife of her distributive share by conveying away his
real property before death. Thus in the principal case there is doubt
as to whether inchoate dower should have been recognized at all,
although by the best precedent the wife was so entitled.
If inchoate dower is to be allowed, however, the Bowditch Table
should no longer be used for valuation, inasmuch as there is no pres-
ent basis for its assumption that dower is certain to attach provided
the wife survives the husband. Since 1932, with dower abolished
in all lands of which the owner died seized, there is now no such
certainty; and if the owner had not been forced to convey his prop-
erty by order of the court, there is at least the possibility that he
would have kept it until his death. Granted that the possibility of
the owner's not disposing of his property cannot be figured on an
actuarial basis, yet it must be conceded that the new uncertainty
added by the 1932 statutory change in policy should somewhat lessen
the value of inchoate dower. There is no evidence that the court
considered this in setting the amount of the award in the principal
case. W.N.P.
SALES
SALES-EFFECT OF REPOSSESSION FOR A SPECIAL PURPOSE
BY THE SELLER UPON A SUBSEQUENT MORTGAGE
The plaintiff purchased a new Hudson automobile from a dealer
and agreed to pay for it by trading in his old car and giving a check
to cover the balance. After using the car a day or two the plaintiff
returned it to the dealer to have a new clutch installed. It was nec-
essary for the dealer to send to the factory for the new part. Pend-
ing completion of the repairs the plaintiff temporarily stopped pay-
ment of the check. Several weeks later the dealer mortgaged the
car to the defendant finance company whose agents secured posses-
sion in some manner and placed it in the defendant's garage.1 The
plaintiff brought an action of replevin for the car. The trial court
1 Both the Eastbourne Garage, Inc. and the C. I. T. Corp. were joined as defendants
in this action.
